Problem Set 4 Answer Key
1. The class in which students earn their own grades will have the higher class average. The class in which students earn the class average as their grade will attract a lot of free riders. The free riders are likely to be (how should I say) academically-challenged, thereby ensuring an overall lower class average.
2. This is in your notes and the text book.
3. Timblin Guards I
a) Guards provide a general sense of security for all
residents that exhibits non-rivalry and non-exclusivity.
b) The marginal cost of hiring a guard is greater than the
marginal benefit to any single individual.
c) See below.
| Number of Guards | Total Cost of Guards |
Marginal Cost of a Guard |
Marginal Benefit per Resident |
Marginal Benefit to all Residents |
Total Benefit | Net Benefit |
| 1 | $300 | $300 | $10 | $1000 | $1000 | $700 |
| 2 | $600 | $300 | $4 | $ 400 | $1400 | $800 |
| 3 | $900 | $300 | $2 | $ 200 | $1600 | $700 |
| 4 | $1200 | $300 | $1 | $ 100 | $1700 | $500 |
4. Timblin Guards II
a) 2 guards with a net benefit of $800.
b) See table above.
c) Perhaps the Apartment Council could levy an annual security
fee of $6 per resident to fund the 2 guards.
5. Rational ignorance suggests that people will not spend a lot of time and money worrying about every piece of legislation debated by governments. Special interest groups, however, will attempt to manipulate the political process to their advantage in order to secure concentrated benefits at taxpayer expense.
6. Mosquito abatement program.
a) Under majority rule, only Charlie would vote in favor of the
abatement program (since he values the program at $100, which is
more than the cost to each owner of $35). Thus, the abatement
program would not be approved. From society's point-of-view this
would be inefficient since the total value of the program to the
three guys ($120) is greater than the total cost ($105).
b) Unanimity could be reached by having Charlie subsidize Art and
Bob's "tax bill." Assuming Art and Bob are willing to
pay their values, Charlie could pay $34 on behalf of Art and $16
on behalf of Bob in order to pay for the abatement program. All
parties would thus benefit.
7. How would you argue?
8. Think about the in-class exercise on pollution abatement.
9. Private costs = $10,000; External costs = $5000 + 4000 + 1000 = $10,000; Social costs = private + external = $20,000
10. Perhaps property values are lower around airports, thus housing is relatively cheaper.
11. Fishermen and sludge.
a) The fishermen will buy the nets at a cost of $3250.
b) The factory will buy the nets for the fishermen at a cost of
$3250.
c) The tax is likely to be set equal to the damage done by the
sludge to the fishermen, namely, $5000. Given this potential tax
liability, the factory will try to minimize its costs by avoiding
the tax. Since the factory is precluded from bargaining with the
fishermen as in part (b), they will be unable to buy the net
system. The next best option is to install the water filter
system at a cost of $4100 (which is better than paying $5000 in
taxes).
d) As Coase would argue, the outcomes in parts (a) and (b) are
identical: as long as property rights are well-defined and
transaction costs are low, private bargaining will result in the
most efficient outcome. In this case, efficiency requires that
the nets be used. However, in part (c), transactions costs were
high enough to prevent bargaining so that only a "second
best" outcome prevailed.
12. We did one similar in class.
13. Check your answers with those of a fellow student.
14.
15. Pollution
a) Cost to Factory A = (10)($60) = $600; Cost to Factory
B = (10)($100) = $1000. Thus the total cost to the town of cutting 20
units of pollution is $1600.
b) If each firm is given only 10 permits, they must each
reduce their total pollution from 20 to 10 just as described in part (a) above.
However, since Factory A can eliminate their pollution cheaper than Factory B
can, Factory A is likely to sell their permits to Factory B at some price
between $60 and $100 per permit. For example, a price of $80 would make
both Factories better off.
c) Suppose that the price of a permit is $80. Then,
Factory A can cut its emissions by another 10 units (at a cost of an additional
$600) and sell the permits to Factory B for $800. The net cost to Factory
A is = 600 + 600 - 800 = $400. Factory B, therefore, is able to continue
producing 20 units of pollution because they've now bought 10 additional permits
at a cost of $800. The total cost to the town is $1200. Note that
this is cheaper than the solution proposed in part (a) above!
16. This was an exam question in the past.